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We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model where parties are o¢ ce-motivated and
uncertainty over the electoral outcome is present. We show that when all dominant parties
(parties with positive probability of winning the elections) have su¢ ciently good chances of
winning, then they agree to change the PR with a more majoritarian rule. We identify the
exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the
expected vote share of the minority parties (parties with zero probability of winning). The
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for such collusion in favour of a majoritarian rule are: a)
the high rents from a single-party government, b) su¢ cient uncertainty over the electoral
outcome and c) ideological proximity of the dominant parties.
Keywords: electoral reform, majority premium, single-party government, uncertainty,
collusion
JEL classi￿cation: D72, H101 Introduction
The choice of the electoral rule is an important strategic decision made in all parliamentary
democracies around the world. In terms of policy implementation, what is equally important
to the outcome of the electoral process itself, is the realized allocation of parliamentary seats
in the legislature, according to the applied electoral rule. This is so, because the ability of
any government, single-party or coalition one, to implement its policies critically depends
on its parliamentary strength. That is, the number of seats allocated to the winning party
is a signi￿cant determinant of political power (Blais, 1991).
One could go one step further, and claim that it is the allocation of seats that matters
the most. Under a Proportional Representation rule (hereinafter PR), a party that secures
a convincing plurality of the vote share can sometimes fail to capture the absolute majority
of parliamentary seats, whereas under some more majoritarian electoral rule (such as First-
Past-the-Post) it could have occupied a larger share of parliamentary seats (Blais, 1991).
That is, it would have been easier for an o¢ ce-motivated party to form a single-party
government and enjoy the spoils of o¢ ce alone, or advance its policy agenda facing less
opposition in the parliament1. It is exactly this feature of non-proportional electoral rules
to distort the allocation of parliamentary seats in favour of the largest parties, that gives
rise to their strategic manipulation by them. Hence, in this paper, we develop a model of
electoral rule change, where the electoral rule is a strategic choice variable, optimally chosen
by parliamentary parties within the context of electoral competition.
Of course, it can be argued that non-proportional electoral rules are deemed to be unfair
and as such rejected by the political systems. Yet, a closer inspection of the real world reveals
that in many countries electoral rules other than pure PR are actually applied in order to
transform votes into parliamentary seats (Norris, 1997). With this observation in mind, a
set of interesting question arises. Firstly, how strategic considerations and opportunistic
incentives a⁄ect parties￿decisions vis-￿-vis electoral rule change. Secondly, which electoral
rule do parties choose given their expected vote share in the forthcoming elections. And
￿nally, what are the key determinants of the strategic choice of electoral rules. To put it
more simply, in this paper we will try to explain why and how parliamentary polities choose
their electoral rules and provide some empirical evidence to that.
This approach constitutes a signi￿cant diversi￿cation from the traditional body of litera-
ture on electoral rules. Rather than arguing in a Duvergerian manner (Duverger, 1954) that
it is the electoral rule -possibly determined by some pre-existing constitutional arrangement-
which is responsible for shaping the political environment, we turn this assumption upside
down (Colomer, 2005). In fact, we explore how electoral uncertainty a⁄ects dominant par-
ties￿strategic incentives to collude and agree on electoral rule reform. The intuition behind
this idea is relatively simple. O¢ ce-motivated parties derive utility from parliamentary
seats but only indirectly. More seats increase their ability to in￿ uence the agenda when
in opposition, or occupy more ministerial portfolios and pursue their policies with greater
success within a coalition government. Moreover, if their seats exceed the parliamentary
1In fact, we do not make a distinction between executive and legislative o¢ ce since in Parliamentary
systems, unlike Presidential ones, if a Party controls or leads the executive it usually commands the majority
in the Parliament.
1majority threshold they can form a single-party government, thus, maximizing the perks of
holding o¢ ce.
In particular, when there is aggregate uncertainty about the electoral outcome, domi-
nant parties2 might have a joint incentive to collude and agree on an electoral rule reform.
This strategic behavior is driven by their desire to form a single-party government and enjoy
the spoils of the o¢ ce alone. In other words, we expect that in multi-party systems with
two dominant parties and competitive elections, the major players will collude in order to
consolidate the status quo. As a result, a more majoritarian electoral rule will be chosen.
In our context, the term "uncertainty with respect to the electoral outcome", implies that
elections are competitive and contested by, at least, two parties that have a positive prob-
ability of winning (Andrews & Jackman, 2005). Moreover, we are interested in ￿nding out
whether dominant parties can also agree on a unique electoral rule reform proposal, other
than PR.
To answer all these questions, we construct a multi-party model of Parliamentary democ-
racy with two dominant parties and uncertainty over the electoral outcome. In such a
framework, we derive the optimal electoral rule endogenously, as a strategic choice made by
o¢ ce-motivated parties through a parliamentary voting procedure. Their goal is to win as
many parliamentary seats as possible, since, increasing the seat share serves a dual purpose.
Firstly, it increases its bargaining power, in case of coalition formation, or its share of leg-
islative o¢ ce and control over the agenda, if in opposition. Secondly, as its seat share rises
above a certain threshold, it secures the majority in the next parliament and eventually,
the ability to form a single￿ party government and enjoy the full spoils of the o¢ ce, both
legislative and executive. That is, we consider that the marginal utility of an extra seat is
less when the party￿ s seat share exceeds the required majority. Then, the party has already
maximized the spoils and any extra seat gains have a smaller impact.
This formulation of parties￿preferences that incorporates their desire to form a single-
party government is the ￿rst novelty introduced by our model. Fig.1 in the Appendix
depicts such a utility function. The discontinuity captures parties￿preference for a single-
party government, due to higher rents and the concavity captures the decreasing marginal
utility of an extra seat, as argued above.
Our second novelty to the literature of electoral rule reform is the introduction of un-
certainty over the electoral outcome. Uncertainty plays a key role in our model since it is
the driving force that allows dominant parties to collude in changing the electoral rule. The
third novelty of our model is that we consider a broader class of electoral rules apart from
PR and Plurality. In practice, following Sartori (1979) who claims that the most common
distortions to the PR rule are the introduction of majority premie and of exclusion clauses3,
we allow our electoral rule reform proposals to take more generic forms. To capture all
the possible degrees of dis-proportionality (from a pure PR to FPTP with multi-member
districts) we introduce in the theoretical modeling the, so called, majority premium system
(Sartori, 1976). This rule allocates a fraction of the seats according to PR and the rest are
2The term dominant party refers to a party that has a positive probability of winning the election,
whereas the rest are minority parties with zero probability of coming ￿rst in the forthcoming election.
3Such as the 10% entry barrier in Turkey, the 5% in Germany, the 3% in Greece and many others in
various parliamentary democracies.
2given to the ￿rst party as a premium4. Hence, by varying the amount of the premium seats
we can simulate electoral rules with di⁄erent degrees of dis-proportionality.
Nevertheless, the above discussion on electoral rule reform omits one extra dimension
that a⁄ects the choice of electoral rule, namely ideology. Therefore, in the last part of our
paper we extend our model to allow for that parties having preferences de￿ned over ideology.
In such a case, strategic incentives to collude over adapting a majoritarian electoral rule
con￿ ict with ideology di⁄erences among the two dominant parties. Moreover, when the
political system is characterized by extreme polarization and ideological divergence it is
more likely to expect that the PR rule will be chosen over any majoritarian one. The
intuition behind this is that by sticking to the PR, dominant parties insure against the
risk of a diametrically opposed party forming a single-party government. This intuition is
con￿rmed by some empirical examples, such as Italy and Greece, where extreme ideological
polarization has blocked, until recently, any attempt to substitute the PR with a more
majoritarian rule. Hence, the interaction between ideology and strategic choice of electoral
rule will also be studied in this framework.
So far, the literature on electoral rule reform has focused solely on o¢ ce-motivated par-
ties. To allow for ideological preferences, in order to study how polarization and ideological
divergence can a⁄ect electoral rule choice, is the ￿nal novelty introduced by our model. But
before entering into the speci￿cs of the model, we ￿rst give a brief summary of previous
literature on electoral rule reform.
2 Literature Review and Motivation
Recent literature on electoral rule reform suggests that the existing variation in electoral
rules across Parliamentary democracies is due to the strategic decisions that ruling parties
make, anticipating the coordinating consequences of di⁄erent electoral rules, in order to
maximize their representation in the legislature, or even form a single party government.
Boix (1999) asserts that if the electoral competition is less uncertain and the existing elec-
toral rule serves the current ruling parties, then status-quo bias prevails and parties have
limited incentives to modify the electoral rule. However, if the degree of uncertainty in-
creases due to new voters, or change in their preferences, the ruling parties will consider
changing the current electoral rule depending on two conditions: Firstly, the strength of the
other parties and secondly, the coordinating capabilities of the dominant parties. Similarly,
if the new entrants parties are expected to be weak, a non-PR rule is maintained regardless
of the structure of the old political system (e.g. USA).
In the same spirit, Benoit (2004) studies the endogenous choice of electoral rules by
parliamentary parties and develops a theoretical framework that classi￿es patterns of elec-
toral rule change in various political systems. His theoretical model derives conditions for
endogenous electoral rule change by rational, seat-maximizing political parties. It predicts
that electoral rule change occurs endogenously, when two conditions are met. Firstly, if it
exists a coalition of parties willing to agree on electoral rule reform, such that each of these
parties is expected to score seat gains under the newly proposed rule. And secondly, if the
4Greece currenlty uses this electoral rule introduced in 2003 and used in two consecutive elections since
2007.
3parties in this coalition can muster enough votes in the current parliament in order to enact
this change.
Those results are in line with the theoretical predictions of our model. Yet, our approach
di⁄ers in two dimensions. Firstly, we derive explicitly the conditions that allow the two
dominant parties to agree on an electoral rule change from PR to a more majoritarian
one. Secondly, we identify that their strategic behavior stems from their motivation for
o¢ ce. Rather than arguing that parties are simply rational seat maximizers, we take this
approach on step further by claiming that parties￿desire for more seats serves another
end. It is their desire to form a single-party government and take full advantage of the
￿ spoils of the o¢ ce￿that allows them to collude, in conjunction with electoral uncertainty.
The latter allows those incentives to align and hence, leaves enough room for collusion.
Our model requires that both parties, participating in the coalition that votes in favour
of the electoral rule reform, have expected utility gains. The basic di⁄erence is that in
our model, expected utility gains do not uniquely imply expected seat gains, but also an
increase in the probability of forming a single-party government for all parties favoring the
reform. Eventually, given agreement on changing the PR rule, only one of them will form
a single-party government. Yet, in the presence of electoral uncertainty and in the absence
of ideological polarization, this is utility enhancing in expected terms for both parties.
In parallel, Colomer (2005) presents and tests the hypothesis that in fact, it is the
number of parties that can explain the choice of electoral rules, rather than the other way
around. He argues that existing political parties tend to choose electoral system that allow
them to "...crystallize, consolidate and reinforce..." the current party system instead of
changing it dramatically. He also concludes that political systems that are dominated by
few parties tend to establish majoritarian electoral rules. Our paper formalizes this idea by
explicitly showing how the strategic incentives of the two dominant parties align, in order
to consolidate the existing party system and increase their chances of forming a single-party
government.
Furthermore, our model extends to show how the strategic choice of electoral rule by
the parties interacts with ideology. Our paper builds upon those stylized facts and presents
some empirical evidence to support the theoretical predictions of the model on how and
why parties choose speci￿c electoral rules, within a certain political environment. That
is, we do not explicitly model party entry and its potential e⁄ect on electoral rule choice.
Although, allowing for new party entry is out of the scope of this paper, our theoretical
model, nonetheless, provides some insight on how party entry may a⁄ect the choice of
electoral rule. Palfrey (1984) considers a two-dominant-party model with new party entry.
But Palfrey￿ s results relate to the position that the two dominant parties occupy in the
political spectrum. Our analysis is distinct, since we focus on another strategic choice made
by the two dominant parties, namely the electoral rule.
Finally, in a paper closely related to ours, Ergun (2010) studies the change of electoral
rule from plurality to PR. He ￿nds that for o¢ ce motivated, rational, seat maximizing parties
the following two conditions have to be satis￿ed for any change to take place. Firstly, the
government must be formed by a coalition. And secondly, the larger the number of parties
and the more equitable the distribution of the spoils amongst them, the more likely the
change to a PR rule is. Starting from the opposite direction, Ergun adopts the same counter-
Duvergerian approach. That is, strategic motivations and the party structure determine the
4choice of electoral rules.
Yet, our approach di⁄ers in four ways. Namely, we model electoral rule change under
uncertainty, we introduce lexicographic preference for o¢ ce motivated parties where the
marginal utility of an extra seat is less when holding o¢ ce, we introduce ideology as an
additional factor in￿ uencing the choice of the rule, and ￿nally, we allow for a broader set
of electoral rules to be considered as candidates during the electoral reform process. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, after introducing the basic
structure of the model, we formally state our assumptions and de￿nitions. In Section 4, we
present our main results, followed by some discussion and the presentation of some stylized
empirical evidence. In Section 5, we introduce an extension of the model to incorporate
ideology as a determinant of electoral rule choice. Section 6 concludes the discussion and
draws attention to the key points of the paper. Finally, the Appendix contains all the
graphs, tables and proofs.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic Set Up and Preferences
Formally, we let N = f1;2;3g to be the set of parties involved in the electoral competition.
All parties in N are assumed to be represented in the parliament. Each party i 2 N holds a
proportion of seats in the preceding parliament s0




i = 1. Moreover, parties
have information about each other￿ s expected vote share in the forthcoming elections. Party
3, is assumed to be a ￿ minority￿party. That is, its vote share shall never exceed that of
Party 1 or Party 2. The expectations on future vote shares are formed by information that
is commonly available to all Parties. The vote share of the ￿ minority￿Party 3, is assumed
to be ￿xed at a level v3, whereas, the vote shares of the other two parties are subject to
uncertainty5. Formally, the vote share of Party 1 in the coming elections will be modeled
as a random variable:
v1 s ￿1,
where ￿1 is a uniform distribution in [a1;b1] ￿ [0;1]:
Equivalently,
v2 s ￿2,
where ￿2 is a uniform distribution in [a2;b2] ￿ [0;1]:
Notice that these expectations need to satisfy
n P
i=1
vi = 1 and v3 ￿ vi; 8i 2 N. That is,
both a1 and a2 are bigger than v3; both b1 and b2 are smaller than 1￿2v3 and a2 = 1￿b1￿v3
and b2 = 1￿a1￿v3: The share of seats of party i 2 N in the new parliament will be de￿ned
as sl
i(vi); where l will be the applied electoral rule. As stated before, we do not limit our
5Practically, our model can be viewed as a multi-party model in the following sense: v3 can be thought
of as the sum of the vote shares of various smaller parties. As long as v3 is less than the vote share of the
two dominant parties, our "minority" party can be the sum of all smaller parties.
5attention to a single electoral rule. Rather, we want to consider the transition from PR to
a wider range of possible electoral rules. In order to capture the big diversity of electoral
systems existing in the world we will adopt the following mechanism l that is based on a
variation of the PR using a majority premium, in a Sartorian manner (1976). The class of
those rules allocates a number of seats as a majority premium to the ￿rst party. That is, l is
the proportion of parliamentary seats allocated to the winning party as bonus. Obviously,
l 2 [0;1] and, thereafter:
sl





i(vi) = vi(1 ￿ l) + l if vi >
1￿v3
2 :
Obviously, given our assumptions, the third party will never be entitled to the bonus as
a result of never winning the election. The above seat allocation mechanism allows us to
capture a wide variety of electoral rules, from pure PR to mixed systems and FPTP6. The
￿rst part is the proportional allocation of the seats minus the reserved premium, whereas
the second part is the bonus given to the winner. The utility of a party i 2 N will be de￿ned
as:
ui(v1;v2;v3;l) = gsl
i(vi) + (1 ￿ g);
where g = 0 if sl
i(vi) > 1=2 and g = 1 if sl
i(vi) ￿ 1=2.
That is, parties in this environment are solely o¢ ce motivated. They care about the
proportion of the seats they hold, but only indirectly. When they lack the necessary par-
liamentary majority, an increase in their seat share increases their utility via two channels.
Firstly it increases their bargaining power in the negotiations for the formation of a coali-
tion government. The larger the number of seats that a party possesses, the larger its
bargaining power. Consequently, the more MP￿ s a party has, the greater its role in the
future government will be (e.g. more ministerial portfolios to its members). Secondly, even
if in opposition, higher seat share increases their control over legislative o¢ ce (e.g. more
committee chairpersons) which allows them to exercise more control over agenda-setting.
Yet, when they control the majority, since their objective to form a single-party government
and maximize the perks of o¢ ce is satis￿ed, extra seats o⁄er them smaller gains. This
formulation of preferences, depicted in Fig.1, allows us to capture this very intuitive idea.
Practically, this type of preferences is known in economics literature as lexicographic.
One can think of the ability of forming a single-party government as the ￿ good￿that the
parties want to consume. Hence, the two dominant parties care about forming a single-
party government. Only in case they cannot form one, because they lack the necessary
parliamentary majority, they do care for extra parliamentary seats in order to increase their
control over o¢ ce, both legislative and executive. To put it more formally, the marginal
6To see this, consider that the case of l = 0. Then, our electoral rule is pure PR, whereas in the case
of l = 1, it transforms into an one mutli-member district FPTP system (the most disproportional electoral
rule possible). For values of l between those two extremes all the other electoral systems can be simulated.
Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix provide the exact calculations on how our proposed mechanism can replicate
the electoral results in Greece (PR with majority premium) and the UK (single-member-district FPTP).
6utility of an extra seat is larger when a party lacks the required parliamentary majority and
has to negotiate with other parties to form a government or occupy legislative posts than
when the party has the ability to form a single-party government. Such a utility function is
depicted in Fig.2 and is a special case of the one shown earlier in Fig.1, since the marginal
utility of an extra seat when the party already controls the majority is zero7. This is done
solely for computational simplicity.
Lexicographic preferences for o¢ ce motivated parties have also been used by Ergun
(2010). Yet, our utility function also captures the desire of parties to form a single-party
government. This is so, because it allows the marginal utility of an extra seat to be di⁄erent
depending on whether the party is above the parliamentary majority threshold or not. Par-
ties￿preferences over single-party governments can be motivated not only by rent-seeking
behavior and desire to maximize the perks of the o¢ ce. Tsebelis (1999) provides evidence
that the increase of veto players in parliamentary democracies, and most notably the number
of parties participating in government, is associated with legislative delay and lower pro-
duction of signi￿cant laws, due to ￿erce bargaining among the coalition partners. Hence,
the desire for single-party governments can also be motivated by an e¢ ciency-maximizing
behavior of the parties. In both cases, nevertheless, it is rational to expect parties preferring
single-party governments.
3.2 The Game Structure
After de￿ning the preferences of the players, we proceed by providing the structure of the
electoral reform game. Formally, the game has three stages:
(i) The current rule is l = 0 (pure PR) and the party with the largest share of seats in
the current parliament (either party one or party two) shall bear the role of the ￿ Proposer￿
of an electoral reform. That is, it will propose l 2 [0;1].
(ii) Parties vote on the ￿ proposal￿l. If the votes in favor of the reform surpass a given
threshold W 2 [0;1] (de￿ned exogenously by the constitution) then, the electoral reform
passes and the forthcoming elections take place according to the new rule l￿. In the opposite
case, that is, if the proposal does not gather the necessary parliamentary support W, the
electoral reform is cancelled and future elections are conducted according to the proportional
rule l = 0:
(iii) Elections take place and each party, according to its vote share and the applied
electoral rule, l￿or l = 0, takes its new seat share in the Parliament and computes its utility.
3.3 Understanding the Proposer￿ s Problem
For simplicity, let us assume without any loss in generality, that the Proposer is always
Party 1. That is, we assume that s0
1 > s0
2 > s0
3: Since the electoral rule determines the
seat allocation for the parties and thus, their utility, Party 1 will propose an electoral rule
l 2 [0;1] such that, given the threshold W 2 [0;1], it maximizes its expected utility. That
is, if W ￿ s0
1 Party 1 will propose l 2 [0;1] such that l 2 argmaxfEu1(v1;v2;v3;l)g:
7In this speci￿cation the MU of an extra seat when sl
i(vi) ￿ 1=2 is equal to @ui
sl
i(vi) = g = 1, whereas when
sl
i(vi) > 1=2, we have that @ui
sl





7In other words, if the current seat share of the Proposer exceeds the required threshold
for implementing an electoral reform, the Proposer faces an unconstrained maximization
program.
On the contrary, if W > s0
1 the proposer needs the support of at least one of the other
two parties in order to implement an electoral rule reform. An obvious, but nonetheless
useful Lemma, demonstrates the behavior of the minority Party 3 in such cases. We state
it below.
Lemma 1 The minority party never consents to any electoral reform proposal.
Proof. Since the minority party expects to receive the premium l with probability zero,
it just expects utility losses from any distortion in the proportionality of the electoral rule.
Its expected utility from any electoral rule is: Eu3(v1;v2;v3;l) = v3(1 ￿ l), which is clearly
decreasing in l:
Given the above observation, Party 1 will have to secure Party 2￿ s support in order to pro-
ceed with an electoral rule reform. That is, it has to propose l 2 argmaxfEu1(v1;v2;v3;l)g
s.t. Eu2(v1;v2;v3;l) ￿ Eu2(v1;v2;v3;0), facing this time a constrained maximization pro-
gram (Participation Constraint8 of Party 2).
In general, since we have assumed that v3 is ￿xed and common knowledge and that
v1 = 1 ￿ v2 ￿ v3, the Proposer faces one source of uncertainty (information about v1 is





























Notice that there exist two critical vote shares. The ￿rst one, (1 ￿ v3)=2, de￿nes the
necessary vote share for one of the two parties to be ￿rst (and get the premium l). The
second,
1=2￿l
1￿l , is the vote share that the ￿rst party needs in order to get the majority of
seats in the parliament, given electoral rule l. Obviously, if (1￿v3)=2 ￿
1=2￿l
1￿l the ￿rst party
will have the a majority in the parliament as long as it wins and thus, the expected utility


















8Hereinafter Eu2(v1;v2;v3;l) ￿ Eu2(v1;v2;v3;0) is referred to as the PC.
8As
1=2￿l
1￿l is decreasing in l, an increase in the dis-proportionality of the electoral rule
(an increase in l) not only a⁄ects the potential seat gains for a party that runs ￿rst in
the elections, but also increases the party￿ s probability of having the majority of seats in
the parliament and hence, forming a single-party government. It is this dual impact of the
electoral rule on parties￿utility that makes the electoral reform process such an important
strategic decision.
3.4 De￿nitions
We will classify the results given the following de￿nitions.
De￿nition 1 The electoral reform process is trivial if W ￿ s0
1
When the Proposer (Party 1) has a large enough proportion of seats in the current
Parliament so as to choose the electoral rule at will, we shall call the reform process is a
trivial one, as it only depends on the preferences of the Proposer.
De￿nition 2 The electoral reform is possible if W ￿ 1 ￿ v3
This is a direct implication of Lemma 1. The ￿ minority￿party never consents to an
electoral reform. Thus, if a reform is to take place, W must be such that Party 3 cannot
block it.
De￿nition 3 The electoral competition is trivial if either a1 >
1￿v3
2 ; or b1 <
1￿v3
2
The above de￿nition just describes the case that the probability of Party 1 running
￿rst in the coming elections is either 1 or 0. In such cases the winning party, which will
also receive the premium l, is known with certainty. On the other hand, when electoral
competition is non-trivial, both Parties 1 and 2 have a positive probability of winning and
thus, getting the majority premium l.





If a party is expected to run ￿rst in the elections, then it shall be called the leading




2 is the threshold above which Party 1 is the winner,
Party 1 is the leading party if and only if E(v1) >
1￿v3
2 . Alternatively, Party 2 is the leading
one.
4 Results
Always assuming that an electoral reform is possible (W ￿ 1￿v3) we can state the following
results.
9Proposition 1 When both the electoral reform process and the electoral competition are
trivial and the proposer is: (i)the leading party, then l￿ ￿ maxf0;
1=2￿a1
1￿a1 g, (ii) not the
leading party, then l￿ = 0.9
This result can be viewed as the simplest case scenario. The idea behind this proposition
is very simple. Since the electoral reform process is trivial, the proposer holds enough seats
in the current parliament to enact any electoral rule reform, without the need to satisfy the
PC of Party 2. Hence, the proposer just chooses l￿ in order to maximize expected utility.
Given that the electoral competition is trivial, if the Proposer is not the leading party (i.e.
sure loser) it proposes that the PR rule is not amended (l￿ = 0). As a result, the electoral
rule does not change. Otherwise, it proposes l￿ ￿ maxf0;
1=2￿a1
1￿a1 g. That is, if Party 1 is the
leading party (i.e. sure winner), the proposed proportionality distortion l￿ will be such that
it will guarantee the formation of a single-party government by Party 1. The solution to
this unconstrained maximization problem yields with certainty the majority of the seats in
the parliament for every possible realization of a1. Hence, by choosing this level of l￿ the
leading party ensures the highest possible level of utility. On the other hand, if it is not the
leading party it can never get the premium l￿, making its utility strictly decreasing on l￿.
Hence, any distortion to the PR rule is not desirable.
Proposition 2 When the electoral competition is trivial but the electoral reform process is
non-trivial, then l￿ = 0:
The idea that drives the result is that in this case there is no room for collusion. The
strategic incentives of the two dominant parties do not align, because there is no uncertainty
over the outcome of the electoral competition. The leading party will always prefer a value
of l￿ > 0 but the other party will always reject this proposal because its utility is strictly
decreasing in l: Since the electoral reform is non-trivial and requires the consent of both
dominant parties, it is obvious why no electoral rule reform will ever be enacted by this
parliament. That is, the status-quo is maintained and PR persists as the electoral rule (i.e.
l￿ = 0).
Proposition 3 When the electoral competition is non-trivial then l￿ 2 f0;
v3
1+v3g:
This is the main result of our paper. In an environment of uncertainty about the elec-
toral outcome, the proportionality distortion l￿ that the proposer might introduce into the
electoral rule as a majority premium, will be such that it guarantees to the winning the
majority of seats in the parliament. That is, in case Party 1, alone or with the support of
Party 2, sponsors an electoral rule reform, it will be such that it consolidates the two party
system and the current status quo. This result is a summary of the results in the next two
propositions. Hence, we restrict further analysis of this result in the following section to
combine Propositions 3, 4 and 5 together.
We now present two Propositions that build on the previous result and state explicitly
the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an electoral rule change to take place. But, before
doing so, for expositional ease we de￿ne function fi(ai;bi;v3) which measures the expected
gains (or losses) of accepting an electoral reform l￿.
9All Proofs in the Appendix.
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Whenever fi(ai;bi;v3) ￿ 0, it means that parties expect gains from an electoral rule
change. That is Eui(v1;v2;v3;l￿) ￿ Eui(v1;v2;v3;0), which in turn implies that the PC
is also satis￿ed. Hence, fi(:) can be viewed as a re-stated version of the PC. Intuitively,
fi(:) ￿ 0, implies that Party i has enough chances of winning the elections. Otherwise, the
opposite is true.
Proposition 4 When the electoral competition is non-trivial but the electoral reform process
is trivial (W ￿ s0
1), then the Parliament departs from PR (l￿ = 0) and adapts l￿ =
v3
1+v3 if
and only if f1(a1;b1;v3) ￿ 0.
Proposition 5 When both the electoral competition and the electoral reform process are
non-trivial then in order for the Parliament to depart from PR (l￿ = 0) and adapt l￿ =
v3
1+v3
there are two sets of both necessary and su¢ cient conditions: EITHER (i) the Proposer is
the leading party and f2(a2;b2;v3) ￿ 0 is satis￿ed OR (ii) the Proposer is not the leading
party and f1(a1;b1;v3) ￿ 0.
In the remainder, we will provide an idea of the proof, followed by a discussion for
each case separately, since this is the main result of the paper. First of all, we note that
formally the proof is derived from the maximization program of the proposer. As shown in
the Appendix and in Fig. 4, Eui(v1;v2;v3;l) for i = f1;2g is convex with respect to l (and
strictly convex for some values of l) for l 2 [0;
v3
1+v3] and decreasing for l 2 (
v3
1+v3;1]. Hence,
the only two candidates for an optimum are either l￿ = 0 or l￿ =
v3
1+v3. Here, electoral
competition is non-trivial. Moreover, when the electoral reform process is also non-trivial
the Proposer faces a constrained maximization program. That is, it maximizes its expected
utility Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) by choosing l￿s:t: l￿ 2 argmaxEu1(v1;v2;v3;l), satisfying at the
same time the PC of Party 2 (f2(:) ￿ 0)10.
We will ￿rst argue why the two candidate equilibrium values of l￿ are either l￿ = 0 or
l￿ =
v3
1+v3. Technically speaking, those two values of l￿ are in fact the corner solutions of
the maximization program. That is, in equilibrium the proposer proposes one of those two
strategies (notice that in each case the equilibrium is unique). Fig. 3 helps illustrating this
point.
Ideally, the proposer would prefer to propose the PR rule (i.e. l = 0), which is the top
of the three lines, if it knew that it will run second and propose l =
v3
1+v3, which is the
bottom line, otherwise. Yet, in our environment there exist uncertainty over the outcome
of the election. Hence, the proposer has to compare the expected gain from proposing the
PR (l = 0) and running second (area ABCD in the graph)11, with the expected gain from
winning in the election and forming a single party government, having proposed l =
v3
1+v3
10Recall that by Lemma 1 the minority party always prefers the PR rule and never agrees to accept any
l￿ other than l￿ = 0.
11Or equivalently, ABCD is the expected loss from proposing l = v3
1+v3 and running second.
11(area DEFH)12. This statement, graphically depicted in Fig.3, is mathematically expressed
by function fi(:), which measures the di⁄erence between areas (DEFH) and (ABCD). Given
that Parties 1 and 2 are symmetric the same analysis applies for the receiver of the proposal
in deciding whether to accept it or not.
Now, the intuition behind these results is more clear. In case the electoral reform process
is trivial the proposer proposes l =
v3
1+v3 whenever the expected gain exceeds the expected
loss, and proposes l = 0 otherwise. In case the electoral reform is non-trivial, and the pro-
poser is the leading party it always prefers to propose l =
v3
1+v3, since for Party 1 expected
bene￿t always exceeds expected loss13. But, when the Proposer faces a constrained max-
imization program it has to satisfy the PC of Party 2, which is analogous to the previous
inequality for Party 1. Whenever the PC of Party 2 is satis￿ed (i.e. f2(:) ￿ 0), Party 1
proposes l =
v3
1+v3, which is always accepted. Otherwise, Party 2 will reject any proposal
l 6= 0. As result, Party 1 proposes the PR (l = 0). The case where the Proposer is not
the leading party is, in fact, the other side of the same coin. Party 2 is now the leading
party and as a result, its PC is satis￿ed. Hence, it always accepts a proposal of l =
v3
1+v3.
But now, it is Party 1 that will propose l =
v3
1+v3 whenever its expected gain exceeds its
expected loss (f1(:) ￿ 0), despite not being the leading party. Otherwise it proposes l = 0.
This completes the intuitive argument.
4.1 Discussion of the Results and Assumptions
In this section, we discuss in greater detail the implications of the main results of our model
which are stated in Propositions 3, 4 and 5. The main implication of Proposition 3 is
that the two dominant parties strategically choose an electoral rule that crystallizes and
consolidates the two-party system. In fact, the optimal level of l (
v3
1+v3) is such that it
completely eliminates the e⁄ect of the third party on the political competition. Of course,
the third party never stood any chance of winning elections, not to mention forming a single-
party government. Yet, in the absence of a majoritarian electoral rule, such as the one with
the premium, the third party could play a role in the formation of coalition governments. In
many instances, it would have had the necessary parliamentary seats in order to in￿ uence the
coalition government and its pursued policies. But in our model, as Proposition 3 implies,
the two dominant parties have aligned strategic incentives to collude in order to eliminate
the political impact of the third party. Hence, they consolidate the two-dominant-party
environment by endogenously choosing the level of the premium l to be
v3
1+v3. Moreover, in
Propositions 4 and 5, we show that this happens under relatively mild assumptions. That
is, we only require that there is some uncertainty over the electoral race, which has to be
competitive.
Therefore, our model provides a theoretical framework for studying the reverse statement
of Duverger￿ s Law. That is, we show how the strategic choice of electoral rule can a⁄ect
the nature of political competition. Starting upside down, we construct a model of electoral
12Or equivalently, DEFH is the expected loss from winning in the election but not being able to form a
single-party government because it has proposed the PR (l = 0).
13Being a ￿ leading party￿(ai+bi
2 > 1￿v3




2 ) we still have fi(:) > 0 for i = 1;2. Hence, by continuity of fi(:) it is still possible
to have fi(:) > 0 even if i is not the ￿ leading party￿ .
12rule reform where parties endogenously choose the electoral rule, in a way that reinforces
the status-quo, in our case the two-dominant-party system. The drivers behind this result
are two. Firstly, uncertainty over the electoral outcome and secondly, parties￿desire to
form single-party governments, once they win elections. The latter, generates the strategic
incentive for the dominant parties to distort the PR rule. The former aligns their incentives
and allows them to collude by proposing a more majoritarian rule than the PR, in order to
eliminate the impact of the third party. Hence, uncertainty over the electoral outcome is a
sine-qua-non condition for coordination. Otherwise, the room for collusion disappears. It is
exactly this combination that allows the incentives to align, under some conditions. Those
are the PC￿ s of the two dominant parties. Regardless of being or not the leading party,
each of the two will agree on electoral rule change if and only if expected gains from an
electoral reform (that introduces a majority premium to the PR) are greater than expected
losses. In such a case, we can see that the two parties agree on a unique proposal l =
v3
1+v3.
Otherwise, as expected, no electoral rule reform takes place. As a result, we are stuck with
the PR rule.
Another equally important implication of Propositions 3, 4 and 5 is the fact that the
equilibrium outcome is unique. Once the two dominant parties agree to depart from the
PR rule, there is a unique value l that is proposed and accepted. Once expected gains from
distorting the PR rule exceed expected losses, the two parties face the strategic decision
on how large premium l to propose. The answer is unique and it is
v3
1+v3. In fact, the
value of l is such that it is the minimum required majority premium that always guarantees
to the winner the ability to form a single-party government. This is so, because Eui is
decreasing with respect to l on (
v3
1+v3;1] but convex on [0;
v3
1+v3]. This is depicted in Fig.4 in
the Appendix.
The strategic dilemma that parties face is summarized in the following question: ￿ Which
electoral rule guarantees a single-party government to the winner but on the same time mini-
mizes the loss of parliamentary seats in case of defeat, given that the outcome is uncertain?￿ .
We already know the answer, and it is
v3
1+v3. This is an important feature of the model. It
implies that parties, not only can agree to distort the PR rule in order to consolidate the
two-party system, but they can also agree on a unique new electoral rule.
This point hints on the idea that, for any given political environment, there exist a
unique optimal electoral rule. In order to check this claim we try to test the predictions of
our model on real electoral outcomes from Greece and the UK. Tables 1 and 2 present the
actual electoral results, the vote and seat share allocations, the ￿ actual￿majority premium
~ l14 and the optimal one l￿15. We also present the observed deviations between the actual
and the predicted values. Our aim is to test the ￿t of the model to real electoral data.
In fact, our model seems to perform quite well in predicting the direction of electoral
rule change in Greece. Greece underwent four major electoral rule reforms in the period
under consideration, namely in 1988, 1991, 2003 and 2006. As one can observe in Fig.5a
and 5b, from 1981-1985 the actual electoral rule is less proportional than the optimum. Yet,
14As we have previously said, our model can accomodate a wide range of electoral rules. Hence, the
actual majority premium ~ l is computed as ~ l = ~ s1￿~ v1
1￿~ v1 and corresponds to the value of the premium when
we allow the actual seat allocation to be replicated by our model. That is, we calibrate our model to the
actual results.
15The optimal premium is just l￿ = v3
1+v3, as predicted by the model.
13during the ￿rst electoral reform PR is adapted which results in the rule being now more
proportional than the optimum. As a result, another reform follows that makes again the
rule more majoritarian. During the third electoral reform, which was ￿rst applied in the 2007
elections16 a 40-seat majority premium is adopted, quite close to the predicted optimum.
Finally, the greek parliament amended the electoral rule in 200617 and introduced a 50-seat
premium, in complete accordance with the theoretical predictions of the model. Moreover,
with the exception of the 1989 elections, the observed gap between the actual and optimal
majority premium is shrinking over time. On aggregate, we observe that the actual and
optimal values are not statistically di⁄erent from each other. That is, the greek parliament
has chosen its electoral rule ￿ optimally￿ , according to our model.
Furthermore, observing the UK Parliamentary Election outcomes from WW II and on-
wards, in Table 2 and Fig.6a and 6b, we can see that although Britain did not undergo
any major electoral rule reform during this period, our model can say something about the
intended reform under consideration by the coalition government. It is clear that the FPTP
rule, in use in the UK, is more disproportional than required by our theory18. In fact, our
calculations show that on average, and with two notable exceptions where elections failed
to produce a single-party government, the majority premium was larger than required for
the winner to form a single-party government. Most notably, with the exception of the 1951
elections19, our model would yield the same results in terms of outcomes. That is, single-
party governments would have been achieved, as Fig.6b shows. Moreover, the magnitude
of the ￿ extra￿parliamentary majority granted to the winner, according to actual data, is
very close to the predicted di⁄erence between the actual and the optimal premium. This
becomes more relevant when one takes into account the projection of the seat allocation
that would have resulted under the AV rule20. Hugh-Jones (2011) claims that ￿ electoral
changes from AV may be marginal￿ . Results show that a more proportional allocation of
seats would have been achieved but ￿ ...they also do not support the argument that AV will
lead to endless coalitions￿ . In a sense, for the British context, the AV seems to ￿t our
de￿nition of an ￿ optimal￿electoral rule.
On a ￿nal note, some clari￿cations are in order. First, with respect to the structure of
the bargaining process de￿ned in our game. One might worry that the results presented so
far critically depend on the fact the structure of the bargaining process between the two
dominant parties does not allow for counter-proposals21. Whereas, this statement would
have been generically true in any other context, in our particular set up enriching the
bargaining process plays absolutely no role in driving the results. The reason for this is the
shape of the Eui, shown in Fig.4. As stressed in Proposition 3, due to the convexity of Eui,
there are only two candidate-values of l for an optimum. And it is also true that by assuming
a non-trivial electoral reform process, one of the two parties can always guarantee its most
16By then, the Constitution has changed and demanded that electoral rule reform is implemented with a
lag.
17Although this rule was ￿rst applied in the 2009 Parliamentary Elections.
18In almost all cases the optimal premium is less than the actual.
19Where Labour won the majority of public votes but Conservatives won the majority in the Commons.
20See Sanders, D., H. D. Clarke, M. C. Stewart, and P. Whiteley (2011), ￿ Simulating the E⁄ects of
the AV in the 2010 UK General Election￿in Parliamentary A⁄airs 64(1): 5 and Hugh-Jones D. (2011),
￿ Simulating the E⁄ects of the AV in the 2010 UK General Election: A Note￿ , mimeo.
21We adopt a "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining protocol.
14preferred outcome, l = 0, in case there is no agreement between them. That is, it has a veto
power, since it can block the electoral rule reform. Hence, the existence of an alternative
bargaining process, where Parties could engage in consecutive counter-proposals of electoral
rules, is equivalent to our set-up and the results obtained under any such formulation would
have been identical. Therefore, for simplicity, but without any loss in generality, we refrain
from adapting a more complex bargaining protocol.
Secondly, a simple comparative statics analysis on the optimal value of l, l￿(v3) =
v3
1+v3,
with respect to the size of the minority party can yield some interesting insight on new party
entry and electoral rule reform. Although, as stressed in the introduction, our model does
not aspire to explore party entry in this set up, the minority party can be viewed as the
sum of many small parties, as long as they do not stand any chance of outperforming any
of the two dominant ones. As such, our model can partially accommodate the entry of a
new party, modeled as an increase from v3 to v0
3, as long as the new entrant is not expected
to upset the dominance of the other two parties. That is, we still have v0
3 < ai; i 2 f1;2g.
Then, one can easily check that
@l￿(v3)
@v3 = 1
(1+v3)2 > 0 implies that the entry of a new party
causes the electoral rule to become more majoritarian. In fact, this point is made by Boix
(1999) who asserts that whenever the new entrants are weak, a majoritarian electoral rule
is maintained (or reinforced) regardless of the structure of the old political system.
5 An Extension of the Model: Electoral Reform and
Ideology
So far, our discussion has attempted to shed some light on how and why electoral rule change
takes place in parliamentary democracies, as a result of strategic choice by the parties. Yet,
we did not provide an account on how ideology might in￿ uence this choice. And although
we do not aspire to conduct an exhaustive analysis on the role of ideology in electoral rule
reform, we will provide some results that yield useful insights on the interaction between
ideology and electoral rule choice. As one might have observed, the predictions of our
model might ￿t well the Greek and British general election data. Nevertheless, there are
some notable cases (e.g. Italy), where a two-dominant-party system failed to produce a more
majoritarian electoral rule than the PR. Practically, from the end of WW II and until the
proposed electoral reform of 1993, Italy used the PR rule. Nonetheless, political competition
was dominated by two major parties (PCI and CD22), especially during the mid-1970s when
they reached the peak of their appeal to the voters. Then, one might expect that according
to our predictions, PR should have been substituted with a more majoritarian rule. We
will show, in this extension of the basic model, that this did not happen due to the extreme
polarization and ideological divergence that persisted in the Italian political system during
the ￿ Cold War￿era.
The intuition behind the ￿ Italian Paradox￿is that both parties utilized the PR rule as an
implicit insurance mechanism against the risk of their ideological opponent forming a single-
party government. That is, strategic incentives to collude were mitigated, or even cancelled
o⁄, due to extreme ideological divergence. As a result, the PR rule was sustained in order
22PCI is the Italian Communist Party and CD is the Christian-Democrat one.
15to insure against the risk of having a single-party government led by a polar-opposite party.
Hence, when ideology comes into play, strategic incentives are reversed. In the remainder of
this section, we will built into our model parties￿preferences over ideology, and explore its
e⁄ect on electoral rule reform. Nevertheless, we need to stress that the scope of this section
is limited into a symmetric case, in order to motivate the "Italian Paradox". Of course,
more analysis is warranted on the impact of ideological polarization on electoral rule choice.
We leave this task for future research.
5.1 The Set-Up
Formally, we focus on the symmetric case where, in expected terms, the two dominant
parties are of equal electoral size and also symmetrically positioned in terms of ideology.
That is, we have that a1 = a2 and b1 = b2
23. Hence, both are ￿ leading parties￿with equal
chances of winning the election. Moreover, we let [￿1;1] be the ideology space. Then, each
party i 2 N has its own ideology denoted by xi 2 [￿1;1], which will implement if it forms
a single-party government. If not, then we assume that a grand-coalition of all parties is
formed. As a result, each party in￿ uences the ideology of the coalition relative to its own
seat share sl
i(vi). Symmetry in terms of ideological distance also implies that: x1 = ￿",
x2 = " and x3 = 0, such that " 2 [0;1]. That is, the Proposer (Party 1) is the leftist party,
Party 2 is the rightist one and the minority Party 3 is positioned in the centre, equidistant
from the other two. The utility of a party i 2 N shall be de￿ned as:
ui(v1;v2;v3;l) = gsl
i(vi) + (1 ￿ g) ￿ (xi ￿ ￿)2;
where g = 0 if sl
i(vi) > 1=2 and g = 1 if sl
i(vi) ￿ 1=2.
Clearly, sl
i(vi) and l are de￿ned as before. The extra term in the function measures the
disutility each party receives when ideology other than its own gets implemented. So, ￿(l;vi)
denotes the implemented ideology and clearly is a function of l and vi, since it depends on
the electoral outcome, the electoral rule and the resulting allocation of seats. Thus, a brief
comment with respect to ￿ and the formation of government is in order.
In case we have a single-party government, ￿ = xi i⁄ sl
i(vi) > 1=2. But in case no party
has the necessary parliamentary majority, the grand-coalition chooses its ￿ according to the
relative parliamentary strength of each of its members24. But given symmetry, it is equally
likely that the major partner in the coalition government will be one of the two dominant
parties. Hence, in expected terms, the ideology implemented will be that of the median25,
that is ￿ = 0, which in our particular case happens to coincide with the ideology of the
centrist party x3. Then, the Proposer faces the following maximization program26:




24One can think of a coalition government distributing the ministerial portfolios to the parties based on
their parliamentary strength.
25We stress that this statement is not an assumption. It is trivially derived when one considers that the
ideology of the median is the Condorcet winner.
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s.t. Eu2(v1;v2;v3;l) ￿ Eu2(v1;v2;v3;0).27
First of all, we note that the ￿rst three terms are identical with the maximization
program presented in the previous section. Moreover, we can simplify the second line
of the expression that refers to the ideological component of the utility by applying the
symmetry conditions. Clearly, the probability of Party 1 forming a single-party government
and implementing its ideology is identical with that of Party 2 doing the same. That is,
1 ￿ v3 ￿
1=2￿l
1￿l ￿ a1 = b1 ￿
1=2￿l
1￿l . Then with probability 1 ￿ 2(b1 ￿
1=2￿l
1￿l ), no party succeeds
in forming a single-party government. Thus, the ideology of the median is implemented.
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As before, a critical value for l is l =
v3
1+v3, since for every l 2 (
v3
1+v3;1] the above








Finally, we note that apart from imposing symmetry the rest of the model remains as
speci￿ed in Section 3. Before proceeding to the main results of this section, we will ￿rst
present a simple illustrative example.
5.2 The Case of Extreme Ideological Divergence
Here, we assume that " = 1. That is, the two dominant parties occupy polar opposite
positions in the ideology space. Thus, the model exhibits its maximum ideological diver-
gence. It is interesting to compare the results of this special case with the results of the
standard version of our model, presented in Section 4. There we have implicitly assumed
that " = 0, since there was no ideological component present. That is, we compare the two
extreme cases, with minimal and maximal ideological divergence. Then, we will generalize
our ￿ndings for all values of ", still maintaining the symmetry conditions.
Proposition 6 Assume symmetry and a non-trivial electoral reform process. Then, (i)
when " = 0 the optimal choice of electoral rule is l￿ =
v3
1+v3, (ii) when " = 1, the optimal
choice is the PR rule (l￿ = 0).
27By symmetry Party 2 faces an analogous program.
28By symmetry, when l = l￿ we have that: b1 ￿
1=2￿l
1￿l = b1 ￿ 1￿v3
2 = b1￿a1
2 :
17This simple example demonstrates the role of ideological polarization in the strategic
choice of electoral rule. Whereas, under complete ideological convergence the two dominant
parties were able to collude and substitute the PR rule with a more majoritarian one, in the
presence of extreme ideological divergence the incentives to collude disappear. Moreover,
they have an incentive to use the PR rule as an implicit insurance in case they fail to win
the elections. And although they still care about forming a single-party government, their
risk-aversion over the prospect of their ideological opponent doing the same forces them
to stick with the PR rule. This could potentially explain why Italy never departed from
the PR, especially during the 70s, when polarization and ideological divergence were at
their peak. Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the subsequent separation of
the Italian Communist Party (PCI) resulted in a signi￿cant decrease in its electoral power
and hence of the ideological polarization, since the moderate centre-left fraction emerged as
the dominant one. This was con￿rmed in the 1992 elections. A proposal to adopt a more
majoritarian electoral rule followed in 1993.
5.3 The General Case
So far, we focused on the case of extreme ideological divergence (" = 1). Yet, there are
societies where ideological divergence and polarization might exist but at the same time
might not be that extreme. Hence, it is important to explore whether the e⁄ect of ideology
on the choice of electoral rule is still persistent. Therefore, we present the results for the
more general case below. Needless to say, symmetry is assumed throughout this section.
Proposition 7 Assume the electoral reform process is non-trivial. Let " 2 [0;1]. Then 9
"0, and "00, satisfying "0 > "00 > 0 such that: (i) 8" 2 ("0;1] we have l￿ 2 f0g; (ii) 8" 2 ("00;"0]
we have l￿ 2 f0;l￿￿j l￿￿ ￿
v3
1+v3g and (iii) 8" 2 [0;"00] we have l￿ 2 f0;
v3
1+v3g.
The above result demonstrates how ideological divergence a⁄ects the strategic choice of
electoral rule by the parties. It is clear that as ideological divergence increases we end up
with more proportional electoral rules. Moreover, for signi￿cantly large values of ", PR is
the unique choice of electoral rule that parties are willing to accept. These are exactly the
situations where the PR is used as an insurance against the prospect of facing a single-party
government with polar-opposite ideology. For intermediate values of ideological divergence,
we observe that dominant parties might still collude in choosing a less proportional rule.
Yet, compared to the standard case where ideology is absent (" = 0), the majoritarian
rule chosen is less disproportional from l￿ =
v3
1+v3, which used to be the optimal choice.
Finally, for smaller values of ", parties face an identical choice as before. But still, even
though we do not explicitly compute them, there are some values of " 2 [0;"00] such that
Eui(v1;v2;v3;l = 0) > Eui1(v1;v2;v3;l =
v3
1+v3) for i = f1;2g. That is, even in this case
the PR rule might be chosen again. Contrast this with the initial case, where under all
circumstances l￿ =
v3
1+v3 was the optimal choice, and one can get a clear idea on how
ideological divergence alters the incentives of the dominant parties to collude.
Going back to the Greek Parliamentary election data, on Table 2 and Fig.4 and 4b,
we can see yet another application of the electoral rule reform as an insurance against an
ideologically distant opponent. During the late 80s the greek political arena was dominated
18by corruption allegations and heated political debate that lead to the indictment of the then-
Prime-Minister in a special court, once opposition became the new government following the
1990 elections. The governing party early understanding the danger its members faced, if
opposition were to win the majority in the parliament, amended the electoral rule to pure PR
in 1988. It did so to impede the formation of a single-party government. Clearly, it achieved
its objective since consecutive elections failed to produce a single-party government. This
is depicted as a jump in the graph. Whereas actual and predicted majority premie co-move
throughout the whole sample, during those electoral periods, it is clear that the electoral
rule was more proportional than before. We attribute this larger degree of proportionality to
the increase in the degree of ideological divergence and polarization that was observed back
then. Hence, empirical evidence from both Greece and Italy seem to con￿rm our theoretical
￿ndings and intuition.
On a ￿nal note, we need to stress that this attempt to account for ideology is not a
complete one. So far, we have focused on the symmetric case, both in terms of electoral
strength and of ideological divergence. We also made particular assumptions about the
coalition formation process. These assumptions might ￿t the particular cases of Greece29
and Italy, however our model does not explore what happens when symmetry is dropped.
While acknowledging this limitation, we stress that the model￿ s predictions even in its
simplest form are in line with empirical observations and intuition. Moreover, it allows us
to isolate the impact of ideology on electoral rule choice. For these reasons, we leave those
questions open for further study.
6 Conclusions
In summary, this paper has attempted to shed some light on the strategic choice of the
electoral rule made by parliamentary parties under an uncertain political environment. With
the aid of a multi-party model of electoral competition, we have shown why and how the
dominant parties choose the electoral rule. By formalizing recent literature that turns
Duverger upside down, we present a model that, we argue, can explain how dominant
parties choose an electoral rule that helps them to consolidate the status quo. That is,we
have tried to explore how the political environment, the structure of the party system and
the nature of political competition a⁄ect the optimal choice of electoral rule.
Our model, one of endogenous electoral rule reform, introduces a series of novelties to
current literature on electoral reform. Firstly, we introduce a clear preference for single-
party governments for o¢ ce motivated parties. The motivation for this can be derived
both from the perks of holding o¢ ce and the desire to be more e¢ cient (Tsebelis, 1999).
Secondly, we expand the choice set of electoral rule reform by allowing for a broader set of
electoral rules that can be chosen. We model this through the majority premium mechanism
which acts as a majoritarian distortion to the PR rule. Moreover, in the extension of the
model we introduce ideological preferences in order to study how ideological divergence and
polarization a⁄ect the choice of electoral rule. Finally, in what we consider to be the most
crucial addition, we introduce uncertainty over the electoral outcome and we explore how
29For example in Greece the two dominant parties the socialist left PASOK and the conservative ND are
approximately of equal strength and have shared almost equal time in o¢ ce from 1974 until 2009.
19the nature of the political competition a⁄ects the endogenous choice of the electoral rule
and the strategic incentives of the dominant parties to collude.
The main ￿nding of our paper can be summarized in the aligned incentives of the domi-
nant parties to adapt a more majoritarian than the PR electoral rule, if electoral competition
is non-trivial. Furthermore, our model identi￿es the two driving factors that allow strategic
collusion of dominant parties in adapting a more majoritarian electoral rule, in the form of
introducing a majority premium to the PR. The ￿rst key element is the presence of electoral
uncertainty. The second is their desire to form a single-party government. When electoral
competition is non-trivial, and both dominant parties have chances of winning the election,
they have incentives to cooperate in order to eliminate the impact of the third party for their
own bene￿t, in the same spirit that big ￿rms would like to take smaller competitors out of
business. That is, dominant parties have incentives to consolidate the party system since
the terms of political competition are obviously favorable to them under the status quo.
But for this collusion to take place the two conditions mentioned above are indispensable.
The desire for single-party government generates the incentive to distort the proportionality
of the electoral rule, whereas electoral uncertainty allows for those incentives to be aligned
creating enough room for collusion.
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that in our model the electoral reform equilibrium is
unique. Once the incentives of the two dominant parties align, there is a unique electoral
reform proposal, which is accepted by the two dominant parties. That is, given the strength
of the minority party or parties, there is a unique optimal value of the majority premium,
l￿ =
v3
1+v3. In fact, the value of the premium depends on the relative size of the minority party
and is such that it completely eliminates its political impact on government formation. If the
PR rule were to remain, then in some instances the minority party might had an important
role to play in the formation of coalition government, when neither of the two dominant
parties were able to form a single-party government. But the introduction of a distortion
to the PR guarantees that this is no longer the case.
But in practice, empirical evidence suggest that, even thought some party systems seem
to con￿rm our intuition, there are also several examples where the two dominant parties
do not cooperate to introduce a more majoritarian electoral rule. To address this issue,
in the extension of the model, we introduce ideology to the preferences of the parties.
We show that, a third key condition was implicitly assumed in order for the dominant
parties to collude, namely ideological convergence. That is, when ideological divergence and
polarization is increasing, our model predicts that the dominant parties￿strategic incentives
to agree on a more majoritarian rule are reversed. Their fear of their ideological opponent
forming a single-party government dominates their desire to form a single-party government.
Hence, they utilize the choice of the electoral rule as an insurance device against the risk
of having an ideologically opposing government. In the case of high ideologic divergence,
our key result states that both parties are better o⁄ by sticking to the PR rule. This can
explain, to some extend, the prevalence of PR rule in some bipartisan political systems.
We conclude our paper with a discussion on future extensions of the model that incor-
porate a more rich set-up with respect to ideology and electoral competition. Yet, the key
results of this paper con￿rm our intuition and are in line with empirical observation. Hence,
our model explains how the nature of political competition and the structure of the party
system a⁄ects the strategic choice of electoral rules by parliamentary parties in order to
20consolidate and crystallize the current status quo.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs
Proposition 1. Since the electoral reform process is trivial, Party 1 faces an unconstrained
maximization program. Moreover, since the electoral competition is trivial, if it is the










dv1]. Then, it proposes l￿ such that it secures with certainty the majority of
the seats in the new parliament. That is, it sets a1 (1 ￿ l￿) + l￿ = 1=2, which implies
that sl￿





v1(1 ￿ l)dv1], which is strictly decreasing in l. Hence, l￿ = 0.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 2. Since electoral competition is trivial one party is a sure loser and the




vi(1 ￿ l)dvi], which is
strictly decreasing in l. Hence, one party always prefers l￿ = 0 but the other, as shown in
Proposition 1 prefers l￿ ￿ maxf0;
1=2￿a1
1￿a1 g. Since the electoral reform process is non-trivial,
the two parties have to agree on the electoral reform. So, the only equilibrium is l￿ = 0.
Proposition 3. Given the structure of the game, to show that when the electoral compe-
tition is non-trivial then l￿ 2 f0;
v3
1+v3g, is quite easy. In the ￿rst part of the proof we shall
demonstrate that, for both parties the exact bonus l that maximizes their expected utility
is either 0 or
v3
1+v3: Then given this result, we will o⁄er a trivial argument to show that if
both parties maximize their expected utility with a bonus
v3
1+v3, this speci￿c electoral reform
takes place, and in case at least one maximizes its expected utility with l = 0 no electoral
reform takes place.
22For the ￿rst part of the proof we need to prove that the expected utility of party 1 is
convex in l 2 [0;
v3
1+v3], strictly convex in a subset of [0;
v3
1+v3] and decreasing in (
v3
1+v3;1]: The
arguments are equivalent for party 2. Since the electoral competition is non-trivial, we have
that b1 >
1￿v3
2 : If b1 < 1=2 then there exist ^ l 2 (0;1) s.t.
1=2￿^ l
1￿^ l = b1: For l 2 [0;^ l] we have







[v1(1￿l)+l]dv1], for l 2 (^ l;
v3
1+v3]
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One may observe that
@2Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l)
@l2 = 0 for l 2 [0;^ l],
@2Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l)









@l ￿ 0 for l 2 [0;^ l] then
@Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l)
@l > 0 for l 2 (^ l;
v3
1+v3]: That is, Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is convex in [0;
v3
1+v3], strictly
convex in a subset of [0;
v3
1+v3] and decreasing in (
v3




If b1 > 1=2; for l 2 [0;
v3












dv1] and for l 2 (
v3





v1(1 ￿ l)dv1 +
b1 R
(1￿v3)=2
dv1]: Just, as before
@2Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l)





@l < 0 for l 2 (
v3
1+v3;1]: That is, Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is strictly convex in [0;
v3
1+v3]
and decreasing in (
v3
1+v3;1]: The only candidates for maximum are f0;
v3
1+v3g: This concludes
the ￿rst part of the proof.
If both parties maximize their expected utility with l =
v3
1+v3 then party one proposes
this electoral reform and party 2 votes for it. If the optimal bonus for the proposing party
1 is l = 0 then it does not propose any electoral reform. And when l = 0 maximizes the
expected utility of party 2 then it always votes against any electoral reform.
Proposition 4. We will only prove the result for values of b1 < 1
2:First let us note that
from Proposition 3 we have that when the electoral competition is non-trivial then there
are only two possible candidate values for an optimum, that is either l￿ = 0 or l￿ =
v3
1+v3:
When the electoral rule reform is trivial then this implies that the proposer faces an un-
constrained maximization problem. Hence for a change of the electoral rule from l￿ = 0 to
l￿ =
v3
1+v3 it su¢ ces to show that Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l =
v3
1+v3) > Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l = 0):Assume








































v1dv1: It is then easily checked that expanding the integrals yields the desired
inequality (b1 ￿
1￿v3
2 )(2 ￿ b1 ￿
1￿v3






2 ￿ a1) which in turn implies
f1(a1;b1;v3) ￿ 0. This completes the argument. Reversing the argument assume that the
above inequality holds true but no electoral rule change takes place, that is l￿ = 0. But then
simple algebra yields Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l =
v3
1+v3) > Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l = 0) which implies l￿ =
v3
1+v3
a clear contradiction. Then the only if part follows.
Proposition 5. We will be using an argument analogous to Proposition 4. Let us ￿rst
note that, in this case, the duality of the conditions is due to the fact that the proposer
faces the constrained version of the maximization problem (given that the electoral reform





1+v3) > Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l = 0) and Eu2(v1;v2;v3;l =
v3
1+v3) >
Eu2(v1;v2;v3;l = 0) need to be satis￿ed simultaneously. It can be easily checked by an
analogous argument (as in Proposition 4), that the condition (b1 ￿
1￿v3









2 ￿ a1), implying f1(a1;b1;v3) ￿ 0, is both necessary and su¢ cient
condition for Party 1 to support l￿ =
v3
1+v3: A directly analogous condition is also true
for Party 2 by symmetric nature of the problem. Hence we only need to check that the



















2 ￿a1):Thus, f1(a1;b1;v3) > 0. By analogy, f2(a2;b2;v3) > 0 when Party
2 is the leading party and with a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 4 it can be
shown that this condition is both necessary and su¢ cient. This completes the argument.
Proposition 6. Firstly, symmetry implies that the electoral competition is non-trivial as
well. Secondly, we note that for every l 2 (
v3
1+v3;1] the function Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is decreasing
with respect to l, since
@Eu1(vi;l)
@l < 0. Hence, we can restrict our search for an optimum in
the interval [0;
v3
1+v3] as we did before. For case (i) we only need to show that symmetry
implies the condition of Proposition 5, since then the same reasoning applies. Furthermore,











2 ￿ a1. But then the condition becomes:
(2 ￿ b1 ￿
1￿v3




2 + a1). Since (
v3
1+v3) < 1




2 + a1 for
every a1;b1;v3 we conclude that the condition is always satis￿ed and hence, l = l￿. For case






















2 ] < 0




(1￿l)2 < 0. Hence, Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is strictly decreasing for
every l 2 [0;1] and as a result, the unique candidate for an optimum is l = 0. This completes
the proof.
Proposition 7. First we note that we restrict attention to values of l 2 [0;
v3
1+v3] since
24for all other values Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is decreasing with respect to l, as shown in Proposition
6. For part (i) we need to show that @Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l)=@l < 0, that is decreasing, for all














@l < 0 i⁄ l2
2 (v3 + a2
1) ￿ l(v3 + a2
1) + 1=8 +
(v3+a2
1)
2 ￿ "2 < 0 which implies that for
every l 2 [0;
v3






2 = "0. Then the result
follows, since there is a unique candidate for a maximum, namely l = 0, due to the fact that
Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is decreasing for every l.
For part (ii) we need to show that for every " > "00, Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) is concave in
[0;
v3




4 ￿ 2"2] < 0 i⁄ " >
p
1=8 = "00.
Hence, by concavity of Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l) there may exist an interior maximizer l￿￿ 2 [0;
v3
1+v3)
such that l￿￿ <
v3
1+v3. Since Eu1(:) is decreasing for l 2 (
v3
1+v3;1], and by an argument
analogous to that of Proposition 3, we conclude that there are only two candidate values for
an optimum, namely l 2 f0;l￿￿g. If an interior maximizer does not exist, then we trivially
have l￿￿ = l￿ and we are in case (iii).
For part (iii), we just note that for any other value of "; such that " ￿ "00, Eu1(v1;v2;v3;l)
is convex in [0;
v3
1+v3]. Therefore, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the two candidates
for a maximum are the same, namely l 2 f0;l￿g. This completes the proof.
25Figure 1: Utility ui(sl
i) as a function of seat share sl
i for i = 1;2:
Figure 2: Special case of Utility ui(sl
i) as a function of seat share sl
i
26Figure 3: Utility ui(vi;l) as a function of vote share for i = 1;2 and for di⁄erent values of l.




272829Figure 5: Expected Utility Eui(l;vi) as a function of l for i = 1;2 when l￿ = 0 is the optimal
choice.
Figure 6: Expected Utility Eui(l;vi) as a function of l for the case (ii) of Proposition 7 when
l￿￿ is the optimal choice.
3031